Direct democracy is a prominent feature of contemporary national politics all over the world, given the fact that direct democracy is in use in well over 100 countries [1] . Of course, all of these countries do not incorporate direct democracy in a strict sense of truly direct, immediate and perpetual government by the people, which is a task that has been recoginzed as improbable if not impossible for centuries [2] . Rather, a modern understanding of direct democracy is one of direct democratic procedures that give voters an opportunity to have a say in legislative issues in addition to the "standard" periodic election of representatives [3] .
The one country that stands out in its frequency of use of direct democratic procedures is Switzerland [4] . Direct democracy is present at the municipal, cantonal 1 and federal levels of polity in Switzerland, and it has a profound effect on the logic of political decision-making [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] . Direct democratic procedures in Switzerland are comprised of mandatory top-down procedures initiated by the executive branch as well as of optional bottom-up procedures that are initiated by anyone who manages to collect a sufficient amount of citizens' signatures. One such bottom-up direct democratic procedure are federal popular initiatives: By collecting 100'000 valid signatures of Swiss citizens, any interest group or even, in principle at least, any singular citizen can propose a change to the federal constitution and bring that proposal to a national vote. In order to pass, a popular initiative has to receive an overall national majority of yes votes as well as the majority of yes votes in more than half of the 26 cantons.
The use of federal popular initiatives in Switzerland has increased since the 1970-ies, as can be seen in figure 1. The increase in popular initiatives has a simple consequence: The probability of more than one initiative dealing with a specific issue has increased. It is, of course, almost trivial to conclude that an increase in initiatives means an increase in the probability of some initiatives addressing the same or similar issues. It is therefore of little surprise that, empirically, several popular initiatives in recent years have indeed adressed the same or similar issues. More specifically, in 2012, 2013 and 2014, there were two initiatives per year that dealt with similar topics. Besides addressing similar issues, the initiative pairs for each year also share another property: For each year, the chronologically second initiative, i.e., the one that came to a vote later, is more radical in its demands than the first initiative. Table 1 provides an overview of the initiatives in question.
In 2012, both home savings initiatives had a very similar goal, the introduction of tax reliefs for homeowners. However, the first initiative only proposed to give cantons the legal competence to introduce tax reliefs, while the second initiative proposed to make tax reliefs for homeowners mandatory on a federal level. In 2013, the "executive pay" initiative proposed to give shareholders of a company a say in the remuneration of the conpany's executive personnel. The second initiative in the 2013 initiative pair, the"1 to 12" initiative, aimed to introduce a fixed, but relative cap on the remuneration in all companies by limiting the highest salary in a company to, at most, 12 times the lowest salary in that company. In 2013, both initiatives of interest proposed the introduction quotas for migrants to Switzerland. However, the "mass immigration" initiative only demanded the introduction of quotas in principle, while the "Ecopop" initiative proposed a fixed quota of at most 0.2% yearly population growth by way of immigration.
As can be seen in table 1, the second, more radical initative in each initiative pair was met with much less approval at the ballot than the first initiative in the initiative pair. This observation lends itself to a plausible prima facie interpretation: The median voter is always more favorable towards less radical proposals. However, a glance at the voter turnouts in table 1 confounds this narrative: There is always a sizeable difference in voter turnout between the first and the second initiative of the initiative pairs, and furthermore, there is no clear pattern between initiative radicality and voter turnout; the second, more radical initiative does not always come with lower turnout.
The goal of this paper is to shed some explanatory light on the relationships between the first and second initiative in an initiative pair. More specifically, this paper seeks an answer to the following research question:
• Do the outcome and the turnout of one initiative influence the outcome and the turnout of a second inititive that addresses a similar issue as the first initiative, but does so in a more radical manner?
Direct democracy and voter mobilization
Several aspects of voter mobilization in the context of direct democratic procedures have been studied extensively. One of those aspects is the impact of direct democratic procedures on voter participation in elections. Early research in the US context has only found scant evidence that the presence of direct democratic procedures in US states boosts election turnout [10, 11] . More recent research, however, indicates that direct democracy might indeed have a positive effect on election turnout [12, 13] . This mobilizing effect in the US ist stronger for mid-term elections than for presidential elections [14] . Presidential elections are thought to have a relatively high salience on their own, but in mid-term elections, peripheral voters might be mobilized by the direct democratic ballot measures [15] . Additionally, there is some evidence that the strength of the mobilizing effect of direct democratic procedures on election turnout is influenced not only by the frequency of direct democratic ballot measures, but also by the campaign intensity for specific ballot measures [16, 17] . The findings for the US context, thus, somewhat consistently show that direct democracy increases election turnout. The same cannot be said for Switzerland: Research has found an effect of direct democracy on electoral participation neither for national [18] nor for cantonal elections [19, 20] . For the present study, another, less thoroughly studied aspect of voter mobilization in the context of direct democracy is more relevant than direct democracy's effects on election turnout: The factors that mobilize voters to participate in direct democratic ballot measures themselves. When it comes to election, it is a well-established reality of political life that most voters do not approach the ideal of fully informed citizens. Instead, voters rely on information cues and shortcuts in order to arrive at voting decisions [21, 22] . It is, therefore, plausible that the use of heuristics should also extend to voting behavior in direct democratic procedures.
Direct democratic voting behavior has been shown to be influenced by heuristics such as knowledge about the stance of political actors [23] . In a broader sense, this finding holds true for Switzerland [24] as well as for the US [17] : Partisan cues matter for voting behavior. Underlying these information based shortcuts, in essence, is to an even simpler and more basic heuristic: What mobilizes people is not so much their level of knowledge (or lack thereof) on specific minutea of a ballot measure, but the mere awareness of a ballot measure [25] and the subjective allocation of importance to an issue addressed by the ballot measure [26] . This type of heuristic has been described as the "availability heuristic" in cognitive psychology [27] , whereby we allocate importance to an issue based on the salience that issue has in our minds.
Salience based mobilization in direct democratic procedures has been observed for issues dealing with morality. One specific issue that stands out in the context of issue salience based mobilization is that of gay rights [28, 29] . Such issue salience based mobilization for ballot measures has also been proposed as a possible mobilization mechanism for elections [30, 31] : Mobilization for a ballot measure based on issue salience spills over into electoral participation.
Hypotheses
For this study, I propose to theoretically extend the mechanism of issue salience based mobilization to the phenomenen of direct democratic initiative pairs. My main assumption is that in the constellation of an initiative pair, the first initiative creates salience for an issue, and that salience carries over to the second initiative of an initiative pair. Metaphorically, this mobilization effect can be described as a mobilization cascade.
This main assumption of the mobilization cascade leads to the following three hypotheses:
• H1: Voter turnout at time t1 will have a positive impact on voter turnout at time t2.
• H2: Voting behavior at time t1 will have a positive impact on voting behavior at time t2.
• H3: Voter turnout at time t1 will have a positive impact on voting behavior at time t2, and vice versa.
The first hypothesis posits that salience based turnout in the first initiative in the initiative pair will affect turnout in the second initiative, because I presume the issue salience from the first initiative will still be present at the time of voting on the second initiative. The second hypothesis posits the same mechanism, but for the actual voting behavior (voting for or voring against an initiative). The third hypothesis posits that voting turnout and voting behavior will positively affect each other.
The assumption underlying the first three hypotheses is one of a strong issue salience based mobilization effect among the initiative pairs. If such a strong effect truly exists, it should be visible not only on a federal level, but also throughout the major subnational polities in Switzerland, the cantons. This leads to the fourth hypothesis:
• H4: The effect of the issue salience based mobilization in the initiative pairs will be universal across the cantons.
Hypothesis 4 is not only useful for testing how strong the potential mobilization cascade in initiative pair is. It is also a precautionary measure against the pitfall that is Simpson's paradox [32] : If a mobilization cascade is found on the overall federal level but is absent on the cantonal level, that is a strong indication that the putative mobilization cascade is actually little more than a statistical mirage.
Finally, some studies have suggested that participation in direct democratic ballot measures can be negatively affected by the total number of ballot measures that are to be voted on [33, 34] . This effect of voter fatigue is explained as the consequence of too many ballot measures vying for the voters' limited attention. The potential voter fatigue effect leads to hypothesis 5:
• H5: The number of ballot initiatives has no impact on the mobilization effect from the first on the second initiative in an initiative pair.
In line with the previous four hypotheses, hypothesis five posits a strong mobilization cascade that transcends the potential voter fatigue effect: The number of ballot measures will have no impact on the mobilization effect, neither a positive nor a negative one.
Empirical strategy

Data
The data used in this study is provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. The specific variables that are subjected to analysis are summarized in table 2. 
Variable
Unit of analysis Yes share t1 municipality + canton Yes share t2 municipality + canton Turnout t1 municipality + canton Turnout t2 municipality + canton Canton municipality + canton Municipality size municipality + canton n ballot measures t1 canton n ballot measures t2 canton n other ballot measures canton n total ballot measures canton
The variable "yes share t1" stands for the yes share of the first initiative in an initiative pair, "yes share t2" for the yes share of the second initiative in an initiative pair. Throughout this paper, I use the yes shares of the initiatives as the indicator of voting behavior (i.e., the voting outcome). It would have been just as possible to use the no shares instead of the yes shares. Given that those two values are symmetrical (one is calculated simply by subtracting the other from 1), the data analysis will behave exactly the same. The variable municipality size with data for the size of the voting population per municipality is included because some studies suggest that the dynamics of political mobilization may be influenced by community size [35, 36, 37] . Because the distribution of municipality size is heavily skewed, I use the natural logarithm of municipality size in the analysis.
Not all variables are available at the municipal level. The variables for the number of ballot measures at the time of the first initiative ("n ballot measures t1"), at the time of the second initiative ("n ballot measures t2"), between the first and second initiatives ("n other ballot measures") and the sum total ("n total ballot measures") are only present at the cantonal level. Most cantons only have a record of cantonal ballot measures and not of municipal ballot measures. Obtaining data for these variables on the municipal level from each municipality directly would have requiren an inordinate amound of work, given that there are over two thousand municipalities in Switzerland
The variables for which data is available at the municipal level cover all municipalities in Switzerland. However, the number of municipalities is not the same for every year, and for some of the years, the number of municipalities is different for the first and for the second initiative. That is a consequence of municipal fusions: A number of municipalities in the Italian speaking part of Switzerland, the canton Ticino, have fused from 2012 to 2014. In 2012 and 2013, the number of municipalities was higher at the first initiative than at the second one. Rather than excluding those municipalities and the municipalities they fused into from the dataset, I manually adjusted the original data to create the new post-fusion municipalities in the datasets for the first initiative. In this manner, no information was lost from the dataset. The numbers of municipalities at each point in time are summarized in table 3. 
Method
The main variables of interest are the voter turnout for the first and the second initiative in each initiative pair as well as the yes share for the first and for the second initiative in each initiative pair. Figure 2 depicts the correlation patterns for the voter turnout in each initiative pair. The strongest correlation between turnout at t1 and turnout at t2 is present in the 2014 initiative pair, the weakest in the 2013 initiative pair. The correlation patterns for the yes share in each initiative pair is depicted in figure 3 . Similar to the correlations of the voter turnout, the strongest correlation of yes share is present in the 2014 initiative pair and the weakest in the 2013 initiative pair. These correlations on their own do not, of course, provide any evidence for or against the hypotheses. But they serve as a starting point and justification for further analytical steps -if there was no correlation at all, that could indicate that further analysis is futile.
The overarching methodical logic of the data analysis is model selection. This means that I compare different regression models and select the "best" one. This selection process, however, is not done by a manual selection of predictor variables according to their significance levels. I am not primarily interested in finding out whether singular predictors have a significant influence on the response variable, but rather in finding which models have the best fit to the data. In order to perform this type of model selection, I resort to the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) [39] . Model selection via BIC is not standard procedure in the social sciences, but this route of data analysis and, to some degree, of its underlying epistemology has been advocated for for some time [40] . There are studies that use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) [41] alongside the BIC to evaluate model fit. While the simultaneous use of the AIC and the BIC might operatively yield similar insights in most cases, they are distinct procedures and shold not be regarded as interchangeable [42] . I opt for the BIC instead of the AIC because the BIC puts greater emphasis on model parsimony, which in turn translates into greater consistency in model selection [43] . I perform the model selection via BIC with the package "MuMIn" [44] within the statistical environment R.
In order to test the hypotheses, several analytic steps are necessary. Hypotheses 1 to 4 pertain to the data that is available at the municipal level, and their testing is done in four steps:
• First, the best simple linear model is selected for every initiative pair, i.e. for every year.
• Second, the best multilevel model with varying intercepts is selected for every initiative pair.
• Third, the best multilevel model with varying intercepts and varying slopes is selected for every initiative pair.
• Fourth, the three resulting best models are compared to each other and the overall best model is determined for each initiative pair.
These four analytic steps are performed twice; once with the yes share at t2 as the response variable, once with the voter turnout at t2 as the response variable. Steps two and three involve multilevel models with cantons as the context variable. In step three, the best multilevel model with varying intercepts and varying slopes is selected. This additional multilevel model is estimated in order to scrutinize hypothesis 4 in depth: In order for hypothesis 4 to be supported, the overall best model needs to be the multilevel model with only varying intercepts. Only the multilevel model with varying interces, but without varying slopes is suggestive of universal and equal mobilization across all cantons. The estimation of the multilevel models is done with the package "lme4" [45] within the R statistical environment.
Hypothesis 5 is concerned with the potential effect of voter fatigue. In order to test hypothesis 5, a separate analytic step is necessary, because the data pertaining to hyposesis 5, the varying numbers of ballots, is available only at the cantonal level. Therefore, in order to test hypothesis 5, an additional analytic step is necessary:
• The best simple linear model is selected for every initiative pair, i.e. for every year.
This step is performed twice; once with the yes share at t2 as the response variable, once with the voter turnout at t2 as the response variable. For this analysis there is, logically, no additional multilevel component, because the unit of analysis are already cantons.
A crucial research design aspect of the analysis in the present study is that the three initiative pairs are always analyzed separately -even though the three initiative pairs have taken place in 2012, 2013 and 2014, they do not represent a time series. Every initiative pair is a separate analytic case; the analysis is only interested in the effects of the first initiative in an initiative pair on the second inititative in the same initiative pair.
Results
Municipal level models with voter turnout at t2 as the response variable
In this section, the results for the models with voter turnout at the initiative t2 as the response variable are presented. With voter turnout at t2 as the response variable, one predictor variable that is used in the models with yes share at t2 as the response variable is taken out of the model comparisons: The yes share at t2. This is, of course, only logical, because it makes no sense to estimate the effects of the yes share at the initiative t2 on the voter turnout at the initiative t2. The best simple linear models for every initiative pair, i.e., for every year are summarized in table 4, the best multilevel models with only varying intercepts in table 5, and the best multilevel models with varying intercepts and varying slopes in table 6. For the initiative pair in 2012, the model with the overall best fit is the multilevel model with varying intercepts and varying slopes, as summarized in table 6. Unsurprisingly, the strongest effect in that model is exerted by the voter turnout at t1. The yes share at t1 has a weak negative effect on voter turnout at t2. The natural logarithm of municipality displays a small positive effect on voter turnout at t2.
For the initiative pair in 2013, the model with the overall best fit is also the multilevel model with varying intercepts and varying slopes, as summarized in table 6. The effect sizes for the fixed effects estimates are very similar to those in the best 2012 model, but the directions of the effect differ. First, the effect of the yes share at t1 is positive for the best 2013 model, as opposed to the negative effect displayed by the yes share at t1 in the best 2012 model. Second, the natural logarithm of the municipal size displays a negative effect in the 2013 model, while in 2012, it had a positive effect.
For the initiative pair in 2014, the model with the overall best fit is, once again, the The numbers below the years are the parameter estimates for the best model for that year. If there is no estimate for a parameter, that parameter is not part of the best model for that year. * * * denotes significance at p < 0.001; * * denotes significance at p < 0.01; * denotes significance at p < 0.05. Fixed effects estimate significance is calculated via Satterthwaite approximation. Standard errors in parentheses. Varying slopes are estimated for voter turnout at t1. multilevel model with varying intercepts and varying slopes. As is the case with the 2012 and 2013 models, the strongest effect is displayed by voter turnout at t1. Furthermore, the effect of the yes share at t1 is negative in the 2014 model as it was in the 2012 model. However, the effect size of the yes share at t1 is far greater in the 2014 model than either in the 2012 or the 2013 model. The natural logarithm of municipality size is not part of the best model for 2014.
Municipal level models with yes shares at t2 as the response variable
In this section, the results for the models with the yes share at the initiative t2 as the response variable are presented. The best simple linear models with municipal data for every initiative pair, i.e. for every year, are summarized in table 7. The best multilevel models with only varying intercepts with municipal data for each year are summarized in table 8. Finally, the best multilevel models with varying intercepts as well as varying slopes with municipal data for each year are summarized in table 9. The numbers below the years are the parameter estimates for the best model for that year. If there is no estimate for a parameter, that parameter is not part of the best model for that year. * * * denotes significance at p < 0.001; * * denotes significance at p < 0.01; * denotes significance at p < 0.05el. Standard errors in parentheses. The numbers below the years are the parameter estimates for the best model for that year. If there is no estimate for a parameter, that parameter is not part of the best model for that year. * * * denotes significance at p < 0.001; * * denotes significance at p < 0.01; * denotes significance at p < 0.05. Fixed effects estimate significance is calculated via Satterthwaite approximation. Standard errors in parentheses. with varying intercepts and with varying slopes. As can be seen in table 9, in that model, the most impactful fixed effect estimate is the yes share at t1. Furthermore, in that model, voter turnout at the second initiative t2 has a positive effect on the yes shares at t2. However, somewhat surprisingly, turnout at t1 is negatively related to yes shares at t2 -such an effect goes against the theoretical expectation of a mobilization cascade For the initiative pair in 2013, the model with the overall best fit is the multilevel model with varying intercepts only. As is visible from table 8, the strongest effect is the influence of the yes share at t1. The somewhat surprising negative effect of turnout at t1 is present in this model again, with a similar magnitude as in the 2012 model.
For the initiative pair in 2014, the model with the overall best fit is, once again, the multilevel model with varying intercepts and varying slopes. The only similiarity the bestfitting model for 2014, as summarized in table 9, has with the best-fitting models for 2012 and 2013 is the positive effect of the yes share at t1. The only other significant effect in the best 2014 model is the small, but negative effect of turnout at t2 on the yes share at t2 -in this model, the effect is much stronger than in the 2012 model.
Cantonal level models
In this section, the models that contain data pertaining to the potential voter fatigue are compared. These models are estimated for cantonal level data, so only simple linear models are selected.
The best models with cantonal data for each initiative pair with voter turnout at t1 are summarized in table 10.
For the 2012 initiative pair, voter turnout at t1 is the strongest effect in the model.
Besides voter turnout at t1, two more variables remain in the model. There is, first, a small negative effect of the number of ballot measures between t1 and t2 on turnout at t2. This implies a voter fatigue effect: The more ballot measures came to a vote between t1 and t2, the less did voters take part in the vote at t2. Second, there is a very small positive effect of the total amount of ballot measures, but the effect is below the conventional threshold of statistical significance. The best model for the 2013 initiative pair is quite different from the 2012 model. Voter turnout at t1 as the response variable is once again the most relevant effect, but it is much weaker in the 2013 model. The only other variable that remains in the 2013 model is the number of ballot measures at t2: The more ballot measures there are at t2, the higher the turnout at t2.
In the best model for the 2014 initiative pair, turnout at t1 not only has a very strong effect, but an impossibly strong one -it implies an effect on turnout at t2 in excess of 100%. Of course, such an extrapolated scenario is nonsensical in the real world (turnout can at most be 1, or 100%), but within the variance of the real data, the parameter estimate can nonetheless hint at a very strong effect. The numbers below the years are the parameter estimates for the best model for that year. If there is no estimate for a parameter, that parameter is not part of the best model for that year. * * * denotes significance at p < 0.001; * * denotes significance at p < 0.01; * denotes significance at p < 0.05 level. Standard errors in parentheses.
The best models with cantonal data for each initiative pair with yes share at t1 are summarized in table 11.
The first information that presents itself from a mere glance at table 11 is the fact that the three best models for the initiative pairs are fairly different from one another. For the 2012 initiative pair, the best model includes a strong effect of the yes share at t1 and a weaker effect of turnout at t2. As for the voter fatigue variables, only the number of ballot measures at t2 is part of the best model for 2012. The effect is very small and positive. For the 2013 initiative pair, the model with the best fit reveals very little: Only the yes share at t1 is estimated to have an effect, and that effect is very large. This is possibly a consequence of the aggregated nature of the canton level data.
For the 2014 initiative pair, the strongest effect is once again displayed by the yes share at t1. Besides that estimate, the only other parameter in the model is a small, but positive effect of the number of ballot measures at t1.
Discussion
The first hypothesis posits that turnout at t1 should have an impact on turnout at t2 if the mobilization cascade held true. This hypothesis is supported by the results: The best models for municipal data for every initiatie pair with voter turnout at t2 as the response variable contain a strong effect of voter turnout at t1 as a predictor variable. This effect is consistently the strongest of all predictor estimates the the best models with turnout at t2 as the response variable.
The second hypothesis posits that the yes share at t1 should have an impact on the yes share at t2. Hypothesis 2 is supported by the results as well: The best models for the initiative pairs always contain a strong effect of the yes share at t1. This effect is the strongest effect of all fixed effects parameters in the best model for every initiative pair.
Hypothesis 3 posits that voter turnout at t1 will have a positive impact on voting behavior at t2, and vice versa. This hypothesis is rejected. For voter turnout at t2 as the response variable, in two of the three models for the initiative pairs, the yes share at t1 has a negative impact on turnout at t2. Similarily, for yes share at t2 as the response variable, in two of the three models for the initiative pairs, voter turnout at t1 has a negative impact on turnout at t2.
Hypothesis 4 posits that the mobilization cascade will be universal across the cantons. This hypothesis is clearly rejected. While the models with the best fit are always multilevel models, in only one case is that model one with varying intercepts only; all other are models with varying intercepts and varying slopes. This means that the mobilization effect is not equal in size across the cantons.
The last of the hypotheses, hypothesis 5, posits that the number of ballot measures will have no impact on the mobilization cascade, neither a positive nor a negative one. Given the results, this hypothesis is rejected as well. While only one model shows signs of voter fatigue (the number of ballot measures between t1 and t2 negatively impacts voter turnout at t2 in 2012), several models show a positive impact of the number of ballot measures either at t1 or at t2 on the yes share at t2 as well as on the voter turnout at t2. This means that the number of ballot measures has, in one instance, a slightly demobilizing effect in the sense of voter fatigue, an in several instances a slightly mobilizing effect.
What remains of the mobilization cascade?
Of the five hypothesis, only two are supported by the results and three are clearly rejected. Is this automatically a rejection of the notion of a mobilization cascade? Not necessarily, but it is a clear indication that a potential mobilization cascade in direct democratic initiative pairs is much more nuanced than has been proposed with the perhaps somewhat naïvely strong assumptions in this study.
Two clear and consistent effects have emerged. First, voter turnout at the first initiative has a strong positive impact on voter turnout at the second initiative an initiative pair.
Second, voting behavior (measured in the analysis as the yes share) at the first initiative has a strong positive impact on voting behavior at the second initiative in an initiative pair.
In the context of these two clear findings, a third finding is important: Voter turnout at the first initiative has a slight negative impact on voting behavior at the second initiative and vice versa. If the first two findings are to be interpreted as a possible mobilization cascade, this third finding points to another mechanism: a demobilization effect. This demobilization effect suggests that a mobilization cascade is not the only dynamic taking place within an initiative pair. Instead, while issue salience based mobilization may be one effect in an initiative pair, demobilization might be another, in that some voters actually refrain from voting in the second initiative of an initiative pair after having voted in the first initiative.
Another indication that the mobilization cascade is not an all-pervasive effect is the rejection of hypothesis 4 which states that the mobilization effects will be universal across the cantons. For most cases, the results of the data analysis suggest that the mobilization effects are not universal but different across the cantons. This points to the possibility of mediating factors within cantons that have an influence on the mobilization cascade.
Finally, the fact that the mobilization cascade is influenced by the number of ballot measures, in a demobilizing as well as a mobilizing way, once again suggests that the mobilization cascade is not as strong as I have hypothesized.
Overall, the findings suggest that while a mobilization cascade in initiative pairs might empirically exist, it is not a universal and strong effect, but a contingent and weak to moderate effect. Not only is the notion of a strong mobilization cascade not supported, but the results of the data analysis are slightly different for every one of the analyzed initiative pairs. This could mean that not all issues are equal; some issues have more mobilizing potential than other. One possible theoretical appreciation of such differing mobilizing potential of issues is offered in the agenda-setting literature with the concept of issue obtrusiveness [46, 47, 48] : Issues that are more immediately intuitive and relevant to citizens in their everyday lives have a higher chance of being salient than abstract issues removed from everyday life. In the context of the initiative pairs analyzed here, the 2014 initiative pair is perhaps an example of an obtrusive issue, because both initiatives deal with immigration.
Limitations of the present study
The biggest limitation of the present study is the analysis of, at best, only aggregated municipal data. In order to explore the question of mobilization cascades more thoroughly, additional research on the micro level is necessary; be it in the form of surveys, be it in the form of experimental designs.
Furthermore, I have found that the best models for most of the initiative pairs are multilevel models with varying intercepts and varying slopes. That means that the mobilization effect might exist, but it is of uneven magnitude in across the cantons. In the present study, I fail to explore the potential factors that might account for that uneven magnitude of the mobilization effect.
Finally, the present study is somewhat myopic in scope. I only analyze initiative pairs in Switzerland, but the ultimately truly relevant question is whether mobilization cascades might be a feature of contemporary direct democracy in general and not just of local Swiss direct democracy.
Normative implications
The empirical study of direct democratic procedures is incomplete without a short reflection on the normative implications of the results, because the normative status of direct democracy is uncertain, mainly for two reasons. First, direct democratic procedures are more likely to be used to further interest group preferences than to further the preferences of ordinary citizens [49, 50, 51] . Second, direct democracy as a proceduralist institution holds the potential to override important normative aspects of democracy, such as minority rights [52, 53, 54] . The latter normative problem became empirically manifest in Switzerland in 2009 when an initiative proposing a ban on the erection of minarets passed at the ballot [55, 56] .
Mobilization cascades could be normatively problematic for a reason that is neither directly related to interest group influence nor to the threat to minority rights. By means of mobilization cascades, voters could become gradually more accepting of more radical ideas by what is, in essence, a mere exposure effect [57] . The fact that voters might become more accepting of more radical ideas is not, in and of itself, a normative problem, because the radicality of a political demand cannot be deemed a normative problem eo ipso. For example, some time ago, the demand to abolish slavery was very radical. However, we wouldn't deem the abolishment of slavery normatively irrational or problematic simply because it was, at one historical point in time, radical (in the sense of proposing a categorical change to the status quo).
The potential normative problem with mobilization cascades is more subtle. In an initiative pair, voters have the chance to express their preference on an issue twice in a row. In a hypothetical situation, voters might express their overall approval of a ballot measure; by giving the ballot measure a majority of yes votes, voters express that they prefer A to ¬A. Now, in this hypothetical situation, the voters get the chance to cast a vote some time in the future on ballot measure B. Ballot measure B deals with the same issue as ballot measure A, but it makes more far-reaching, more radical demands. If preferences were fixed, ballot measure B would either pass or get rejected because the median voter either prefers A to B or B to A. However, if voter preferences aren't fixed but are, as assumed by the mechanism of the mobilization cascade, shaped in part by the fact that there was a ballot measure on the same issue in the recent past, the general problem of cyclical preferences, or, more specifically, of Arrow's impossibility theorem [58] in direct democracy [49, 59] , becomes more pronounced. Not only does the median voter have a set of preferences that might be cyclical, but the preference order is not fixed but shaped by real-world exposure to policy options.
The potential normative problem with mobilization cascades, therefore, lies in its preference altering effect. This is a subtle, but fundamental potential problem. Direct democratic decision-making is supposed to reflect the "honest" preferences of the voters. However, if those preferences are not endogeneous to the voters but are instead unwittingly shaped by the exogeneous mechanism of conducting direct democratic decision-making processes, the whole direct-democratic affair becomes, in principle, somewhat circular.
How much of an actual normative problem is this potential normative problem given the empirical results? The data analysis suggests that mobilization cascades might exist, but they are not strong effects. Consequently, the actual normative problem of mobilization cascades exacerbating Arrow's impossibility theorem should not be overstated. This normative question does, however, warrant future scientific attention.
